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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
I

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff - Respondent,

- vs. -

Case No.
10905

ROBERT LEE DIXON,
Defendant - Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Robert Lee Dixon, appeals from
a conviction by jury trial for the crime of grand
larceny.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted on jury trial for
'he charged offense of grand larceny.

HEUEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction in
lower court or, in the alternative, a new trial.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, State of Utah, agrees with the statement of facts as contained in the brief of the appei.
lant, with the following additional facts and exrn 0
tions.
'

,

Two to three minutes prior to the occurrencs·
of the incident in question, the assistant manager
of the store, Mr. Thomas Woodside, observed a stack
of $20 bills in the cash register in question (R. 19-20).
Mr. Woodside testified that immediately after the
incident, he closed off the register (R. 39, 68). After
apprehending the defendant, he made a preliminary
determination as to the amount of money that was
missing from the cash register and was able to determine that 3.11 of the $20 bills were missing (R. 261.
Mr. Woodside also testified on cross-examination
that it was dark at the time of the chase (R. 30).
Mr. Dennis H. Richardson, assistant store manager, testified that he made a search of the area tha1
same evening the incident occurred in an effort to
find the money, but found nothing because it was
dark (R. 75). The next morning a number of $20 bills
were found by Mr. Richardson in a weed patch (R
78). Mr. Richardson testified that when he first count·
ed the money, he thought there was $180. Two days
later, Mr. Richardson obtained the money from the
safe and handed it to Mr. Woodside (R. 24), who in '
tum gave ten $20 bills to Officer Larry J. Sturdevart '
(R. 24 and 92), in the presence of Mr. Richardson (R
93-4).
1

3
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE CURRENCY OFFERED BY
THE PROSECUTION AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
:idmission of the currency into evidence by the State
1s controlled by the law, as set out in appellant's brief
in regard to the chain of possession, respondent submits that the testimonv produced at the time of trial
sustains a complete chain of evidence identifying
the currency from the moment it was found to its
admission.
The record discloses that Mr. Dennis H. Richard~on found the money (R. 77), placed it in a safe (R.
78), later handed it to Mr. Thomas Woodside (R. 24),
\'.rho, in lurn, gave it to Officer Larry Sturdevant (R. 24
and 92). Officer Sturdevant testified that Exhibit A,
lhe currency in question, was the ten $20 bills he
acquired from Thomas Woodside (R. 91-2).
The appellant in his brief would require the
prosecution to establish a complete chain of control
over the evidence and affirmatively establish that
no others had access to such evidence, without any
regard as to the ease or difficulty with which the
Particula.r evidence could have been altered. As to
thr:i practicalities of proof, it is submitted that the
prosecution need only establish that it is reasonably
~ertain that substitution, alteration, or tampering did
not occur. Eisentrager v. State, 79 Nev. 38, 378 P.2d

4

526 (1963); People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 3CJS p
(1956), cert. den. 353 U.S. 930, I L.Ed.2d 724, 77 ..
721, appeal dism. 358 TJ.S 646, 3 L.Ed.2d 568, 79
537.

1 ,

Respondent submits that the type of
]nvolved in the cases cited by appellant is
that in the instant case in that alteration of the ev
dence in this case, if any, does not obliterate._,
change the condition which is sought to be shcw.,r:
that is, the amount taken was more than $50 .. ·
The confusion of thjs case rests on the fact
money, in general, is all alike. Since Mr. Richardso:
could not absolutely identify the currency on
stand, the prosecution attempted to establish ·•·
chain, showing the possession of the currency
the moment it was found untll the moment it w0,
introduced at the time of trial. The exhibit was
missible so fa.r as identity is concerned when it
been identified as being the same object abm: ·
which the testimony was being given and wher. - '
was stated as beinQ in the same condition as :d
time of the occurrence 1n questlon. State v. Lee,
Ariz. 213, 295 P.2d 380 (1956); State v. Price, 7G Ari:
385, 265 P.2d 444 (l_ 954): State v. Weis, 92 Anz. ·
375 P.2d 735 (1962). See generally 2 Wharton Criminal Evidence,§ 675 (12th ed. 1955).
1

The type of evidence involved in the cise Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Chugg, 3
399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957) and Clayton v. Metropolitan!
Life Insurance Co" 96 Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819 (I 1
was an expert's analysis of an object where a
1

1

1

i

I

I
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of possessjon shows 1t is as likely as net
+ The evidence analyzed was not the evidence
ncr:n.11y received. See People v. Riser, supra, and
'"IS"'3 rxJllected m 21 A.L.R.2d 1216 (1952).
·· rhi)Jn

It 1s the further contention of respondent that
tlie currency admitted into evidence merely supple,,1entcd the testimony of the witnesses. The admiss1nn o± the currency into evidence is not necessary,
smce the evidence without the admission of the currency was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State
v. Campbell. 116 Utah 74, 208 P.2d 530 (1949). In that
case, this court stated:
"Tf the expert's opinion was founded upon false

premises-the wrong articles, 0r defective articlesthat is a matter of cross examination, and of defense. The prosecution proved generally the condition of articles by their valuations; the defense
has the burden of tearing down that testimony by
croBs-examination or by demanding the production
of the articles and introducing them if their presentation would refute the values advanced by the
p'.1)secutinn. If the condition of clothes or of other
articles is to be shown in a case, it is not absolutely
necessary that they be produced in court; they may
be described."
( 116 Utah at 80)

Se'e also State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d
(1943). reversed on other grounds, 105 Utah 162,
1JS P.2.d 494 (1944); Spittorff v. State, 108 Ind. 171,
:~ n r. CJ t J 0 886)

6
It has been held in a number of Utah cases
testimony of one acquainted with the value of lhf'
stolen property is sufficient to make out a value 0~
over $50 for purposes of grand larceny. State v.
Little. 5 U.2d 42, 296 P.2d 289 (1956); State v. Myer~.
5 U.2d 365, 302 P.2d 276 (1956); State v. Vigil, 12:
Utah 495. 260 P.2d 539 (1953); and State v. Campbell,
supra.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT, THAT THE COURT
ERRED IN FAILING TO PROHIBIT THE STATE'S
ATTORNEY FROM ARGUING FLIGHT BY DEFENDANT IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

The record does not support the conclusion thar ,
the lower court denied appellant's requests prohibiting counsel for the State from arguing the inference
of flight by the defendant or the fact that counsel
for the State even argued such inference before thP
jury.
1

State v. Hanna. 81 Utah 583, 21 P.2d 537 (1933i
on which appellant relies is distinguished from the
instant case in that although argument of couns~
were not recorded, the objection to the arc.1'L 1mrn 1
and subsequent discussions were part of the tnr
script.

Where, as in the instant case, arguments to the

1

1

1

I

I

I

7
by counsel are not preserved in the record,
cowt in Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543,
136 P2d 968 (1948), stated:

:

11

v-

"Since the arguments of counsel were not preserved
in the record, we are hardly in a position to say
that the argument of plaintiff's counsel to the jury
wns improper, and grounds for reversal. Error will
not be µresumed, nor can we presume misconduct
on the part of counsel. ... There is nothing in the
record before us on which this court could hold counsel guilty of improper conduct." (113 Utah at 558)

This court was held in a criminal case that
v.rhere aryuments of counsel to jury were not pres,2i:ved in the record, a reversal could not be predi011 the ground that the prosecuting attorney
.~. F,rou_rn>=int to the jury made improper and prejudi~:ol stataments. State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201
This court has held in a criminal case that
P 764 (l 949). See also 4 Am. Jur.2d, Appeal and
Error, s 541 (1962), and Annotation 67 A.L.R.2d 297,
' 13 (] 959).

CONCLUSION
The lower court did not err in admitting into
"''' ·knee c1 urency at the time of trial because the
'rd disc102.es n. complete chain of possession and
identification.
does not disclose any prejudicial
1 ·1fYlmitt·?d by the court.

Th2 record
· 11

8
Respondent 11rges, therefore, that 1-he
=ip~)elL""nt be affirmed.

:::if th·-::

Respectfully submitrrd.

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

TOM G. PLATIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

